Below I contrast the results reported in the paper with the results reported in JK's book MS and her doctoral dissertation (Yale 2003). It is also compared to the previous version which was submitted to AJPS in September 2005

The most serious falsification is the claim that the results (that presidency increases corruptions) were obtained based on the sample of democratic countries only, while in fact, the actual sample included at least 16 highly corrupt, non-democratic presidential regimes, such as Iraq, Iran, N. Korea, Syria, Cuba and China among others (see the full list of countries below)

Yet there are also many other problems, such as inflating the statistical significance of the results (because even in the sample of 123 countries the claim was not supported)

I review tables from the paper in the reverse order - starting from the Appendix (Table 1A), then Table 3, Table 2 and Table 1.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: ANOTHER PERIL OF PRESIDENTIALISM?

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California Institute of Technology

Current version: February 2006

Currently under review in The Journal of Politics,
downloaded: May 30, 2006 from
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jana/papers.html

Abstract

In this paper, I explore how constitutional structures that define the executive-legislative relations affect political corruption. Using a principal-agent framework, I argue that weakening of re-election incentives by term limits and relaxing the constraining role of legislatures by granting the president numerous powers increase the level of corruption in the entire political system. Empirically, I find that presidential systems are associated with higher levels of perceived corruption after controlling for a multitude of economic, institutional, and societal factors. The theoretical story that regimes with extensive presidential prerogatives and with term limits are more corrupt also receives statistical support in the data.

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125. Email: jana@hss.caltech.edu. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the meetings of the Public Choice Society, March 2002, San Diego, CA, and the Midwest Political Science Associations Meetings, April 2002, Chicago, IL. I am grateful to the conference participants, as well as to Mike Alvarez, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Geoff Garrett, Peter Ordeshook, Rod Kiewiet, Olga Shvetsova, and Mikhail Filippov for comments on various drafts.

a draft version of the book MS, with practically the same tables is still available online:
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jana/partI.pdf
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jana/PART%20II%20web.pdf

Page 42 from the paper currently under review in The Journal of Politics

This would have looked impressive, but different standard errors of the main variable are reported in the book manuscript and the dissertation (see next page) while ALL other numbers remain the same

APPENDIX

Table A1. Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets]. Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model4	Model 5	Model 6
PRES	***-1.20	*** -0.50	*-0.24	*-0.17	-0.22	**-0.21
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.12]	[0.08]	[0.12]	[0.10]
GDPPC			***0.56	*** 0.46	***0.59	*** 0.56
			[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]
CURDEMO			***0.03			
			[0.01]			
FH9301				*** -0.17		
				[0.03]		
STABDEMO					***0.55	0.12
					[0.17]	[0.19]
FEDERAL						-0.14
						[0.13]
BRITCOL						0.12
						[0.14]
PROT						*** 0.01
						[0.00]
AFRICA		* -0.32	0.25	0.09	0.25	-0.03
		[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.18]	[0.21]
ASIAE		0.32	0.23	* 0.29	0.28	0.22
		[0.26]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.20]
LAAM		-0.21	***-0.47	*** -0.50	-0.25	-0.08
		[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.18]
OECD		*** 1.16	*0.3	0.27	0.14	-0.03
		[0.21]	[0.18]	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.22]
POSTCOM		*** -0.51	*-0.3	***0.38	-0.12	0.08
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.21]	[0.22]
CONSTANT	***0.90	** 0.41	***-4.66	*** -3.04	***-4.84	**-0.47
	[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.58]	[0.63]	[0.67]	[0.19]
Adj.R-sq.	0.34	0.54	0.78	0.81	0.79	0.8
N.obs.	123	123	105	112	81	75

False standard errors and statistical significance are reported here (Table A1) and in Table 1 of the paper

This was first inserted on September 15, 2005.

"Joint significance" of the variables (Table 3, see below) was also first reported in the September 15, 2005 version

The list of 123 countries was also removed from the text on September 15, 2005.

The September 14 2005 version still had correct standard errors (as in the book) and did not report any "joint significance" of the variables. It also provided a list of 123 countries.

(see attached zip files with different drafts of the paper - September 14, September 15 and September 17 2005)

Notice that there are 123 observations - as 123 countries are included in the sample, though some independent variables have many missing values, reducing the number of observations in some regressions to 75 (as in Model 6)

Compare with the numbers on the previous page

Table A1. The Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model4	Model 5	Model 6	Model7
PRES	***-1.20	*** -0.50	*-0.24	-0.17	-0.22	-0.21	-0.21
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.13]	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.15]	[0.14]
GDPPC			***0.56	*** 0.46	***0.59	*** 0.56	*** 0.56
			[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.07]
CURDEMO			***0.03				
			[0.01]				
FH9301				*** -0.17			
				[0.03]			
STABDEMO					***0.55	0.12	0.23
					[0.17]	[0.19]	[0.19]
FEDERAL						-0.14	-0.11
						[0.13]	[0.13]
BRITCOL						0.12	0.07
						[0.14]	[0.12]
PROT						*** 0.01	* 0.00
						[0.00]	[0.00]
OPEN							0
							[0.00]
LOGPOP							-0.11
							[0.10]
AFRICA		* -0.32	0.25	0.09	0.25	-0.03	
		[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.18]	[0.21]	
ASIAE		0.32	0.23	* 0.29	0.28	0.22	
		[0.26]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.20]	
LAAM		-0.21	***-0.47	*** -0.50	-0.25	-0.08	
		[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.18]	
OECD		*** 1.16	*0.3	0.27	0.14	-0.03	
		[0.21]	[0.18]	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.22]	
POSTCOM		*** -0.51	*-0.3	***0.38	-0.12	0.08	
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.21]	[0.22]	
CONSTANT	***0.90	** 0.41	***-4.66	*** -3.04	***-4.84	**-0.47	-0.3
	[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.58]	[0.63]	[0.67]	[0.19]	[0.23]
Adj.R-sq.	0.34	0.54	0.78	0.81	0.79	0.8	0.82
N.obs.	123	123	105	112	81	75	66

Page 77 from the dissertation (Yale, May 2003) All number are the same as in the book MS (above).
The only difference between the book and the Dissertation is that WLS method is claimed to be used in the dissertation.

In fact, this is the main trick of the paper. There are six tables in the dissertation - 3 with OLS results (Table 1a, 2a and 3a) and 3 with WLS results (1b, 2b and 3b - the same models, different statistical techniques). The old OLS tables from the dissertation is the basis to fake "new," shorter Tables - 1, 2 and 3 for the paper (and for the book), while the old WLS tables from the dissertation now are the "new" OLS Tables A1, A2 and A3 (both in the paper and in the book). I mark these metamorphoses "WLS to OLS".

	Dissertation	Book		Paper	
Table	1a	5.1	(falsified)	1	(falsified + new fabrication)
	2a	5.2	(falsified)	2	(falsified)
	3a	5.3	(falsified)	3	(falsified + "joint significance" is claimed - fabricated?)
	1b	A1	(WLS to OLS)	A1	(WLS to OLS + falsified, additional fabrication between AJPS and The JoP rounds)
	2b	A2	(WLS to OLS)	A2	(WLS to OLS)
	3b	A2	(WLS to OLS)	A3	(WLS to OLS + "joint significance" is claimed - fabricated?)

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Weighted Least Squares [standard errors in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
pres	***	-1.20	0.00	***	-0.50	0.00	*	-0.24	0.07		-0.17	0.14		-0.22	0.12		-0.21	0.16		-0.21	0.15
		[0.15]			[0.16]			[0.13]			[0.11]			[0.14]			[0.15]			[0.14]	
gdppc							***	0.56	0.00	***	0.46	0.00	***	0.59	0.00	***	0.56	0.00	***	0.56	0.00
								[0.07]			[0.06]			[0.08]			[0.07]			[0.07]	
curdemo							***	0.03	0.00												
								[0.01]													
freedhs										***	-0.17	0.00									
											[0.03]										
stabdemo													***	0.55	0.00		0.12	0.53		0.23	0.22
														[0.17]			[0.19]			[0.19]	
federal																	-0.14	0.28		-0.11	0.38
																	[0.13]			[0.13]	
britcol																	0.12	0.40		0.07	0.56
																	[0.14]			[0.12]	
prot																***	0.01	0.01	*	0.00	0.09
																	[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																				0.00	0.33
																				[0.00]	
logpop																				-0.11	0.26
																				[0.10]	
africa				*	-0.32	0.10		0.25	0.12		0.09	0.54		0.25	0.18		-0.03	0.89			
					[0.19]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.18]			[0.21]				
asiae					0.32	0.22		0.23	0.22	*	0.29	0.10		0.28	0.17		0.22	0.28			
					[0.26]			[0.19]			[0.18]			[0.20]			[0.20]				
laam					-0.21	0.32	***	-0.47	0.01	***	-0.50	0.00		-0.25	0.15		-0.08	0.69			
					[0.21]			[0.16]			[0.15]			[0.17]			[0.18]				
oecd				***	1.16	0.00	*	0.30	0.10		0.27	0.10		0.14	0.49		-0.03	0.89			
					[0.21]			[0.18]			[0.16]			[0.21]			[0.22]				
postcom				***	-0.51	0.01	*	-0.30	0.06	***	-0.38	0.01		-0.12	0.58		0.08	0.72			
					[0.20]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.21]			[0.22]				
_cons	***	0.90	0.00	**	0.41	0.01	***	-4.66	0.00	***	-3.04	0.00	***	-4.84	0.00	**	-0.47	0.01		-0.30	0.21
		[0.12]			[0.16]			[0.58]			[0.63]			[0.67]			[0.19]			[0.23]	
Adj. R-sq.		0.34			0.54			0.78			0.81			0.79			0.80			0.82	
N. obs.		123.00			123.00			105.00			112.00			81.00			75.00			66.00	

Amazingly, yet another version of the same page exits - from the submission to the AJPS (September 17, 2005). ALL NUMBERS are the SAME as in the current version (for The JoP), but in Model 6 false statistical significance of variable PRES was claimed to be just one *, not two **'s as in the current draft.
In other words, in September 2005 it was a more "modest", "softer" version of the same falsification.
After AJPS rejected the paper, the author reports "stronger" results for the JoP (see also next page)

APPENDIX

Table A1. Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model4	Model 5	Model 6
PRES	***-1.20	*** -0.50	*-0.24	*-0.17	-0.22	*-0.21
	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.12]	[0.08]	[0.12]	[0.10]
GDPPC			***0.56	*** 0.46	***0.59	*** 0.56
			[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]
CURDEMO			***0.03			
			[0.01]			
FH9301				*** -0.17		
				[0.03]		
STABDEMO					***0.55	0.12
					[0.17]	[0.19]
FEDERAL						-0.14
						[0.13]
BRITCOL						0.12
						[0.14]
PROT						*** 0.01
						[0.00]
AFRICA		* -0.32	0.25	0.09	0.25	-0.03
		[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.18]	[0.21]
ASIAE		0.32	0.23	* 0.29	0.28	0.22
		[0.26]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.20]
LAAM		-0.21	***-0.47	*** -0.50	-0.25	-0.08
		[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.18]
OECD		*** 1.16	*0.3	0.27	0.14	-0.03
		[0.21]	[0.18]	[0.16]	[0.21]	[0.22]
POSTCOM		*** -0.51	*-0.3	***0.38	-0.12	0.08
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.21]	[0.22]
CONSTANT	***0.90	** 0.41	***-4.66	*** -3.04	***-4.84	**-0.47
	[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.58]	[0.63]	[0.67]	[0.19]
Adj.R-sq.	0.34	0.54	0.78	0.81	0.79	0.8
N.obs.	123	123	105	112	81	75

Table A3. Effect of Term Limits on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model3	Model4	Model 5	Model 6
PRES	-0.24	0.08	* 0.77	0.55	0.31	0.11
	[0.73]	[0.62]	[0.45]	[0.41]	[0.47]	[0.47]
FINITTRM	1.1	0.63	** 0.82	*0.67	0.5	0.26
	[0.68]	[0.59]	[0.40]	[0.38]	[0.43]	[0.43]
PRESFINT	-0.99	-0.62	**-1.07	* -0.78	-0.56	-0.37
	[0.75]	[0.64]	[0.46]	[0.42]	[0.49]	[0.50]
GDPPC			*** 0.55	*** 0.45	*** 0.58	*** 0.58
			[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.08]
CURDEMO			*** 0.04			
			[0.01]			
FH9301				***-0.17		
				[0.03]		
STABDEMO					***0.53	0.12
					[0.17]	[0.19]
FEDERAL						-0.14
						[0.13]
BRITCOL						0.1
						[0.14]
PROT						*** 0.01
						[0.00]
AFRICA		* -0.36	0.19	0.04	0.21	-0.03
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.18]	[0.21]
ASIAE		0.28	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.21
		[0.27]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.21]	[0.21]
LAAM		-0.23	*** -0.49	*** -0.52	-0.27	-0.07
		[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.18]	[0.20]
OECD		***1.11	0.23	0.21	0.1	-0.05
		[0.22]	[0.18]	[0.17]	[0.21]	[0.23]
POSTCOM		*** -0.54	***-0.35	*** -0.43	-0.16	0.05
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.21]	[0.23]
CONSTANT	-0.16	-0.16	*** -5.32	*** -3.60	***-5.27	*-0.68
	[0.67]	[0.56]	[0.69]	[0.71]	[0.78]	[0.40]
Adj. R-sq.	0.34	0.54	0.79	0.81	0.78	0.8
N.obs.	122	122	104	112	81	75

On this page of the AJPS version, all numbers were the same as in the current version (for The JoP), but, importantly, the table from the AJPS version does not report the "joint statistical significance" of the variables at 5% level for Models 5 and 6, as now the JoP version does (compare with the next page)

now "jointly significant at 0.05 level" is reported for Models 5 and 6 (see previous page).

Table A3. Effect of Term Limits on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

♦ jointly significant at .05 level

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
PRES	-0.24	0.08	* 0.77	0.55	♦0.31	♦0.11
	[0.73]	[0.62]	[0.45]	[0.41]	[0.47]	[0.47]
FINITTRM	1.1	0.63	** 0.82	*0.67	♦0.5	♦0.26
	[0.68]	[0.59]	[0.40]	[0.38]	[0.43]	[0.43]
PRESFINT	-0.99	-0.62	**-1.07	* -0.78	♦-0.56	♦-0.37
	[0.75]	[0.64]	[0.46]	[0.42]	[0.49]	[0.50]
GDPPC			*** 0.55	*** 0.45	*** 0.58	*** 0.58
			[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.08]
CURDEMO			*** 0.04			
			[0.01]			
FH9301				***-0.17		
				[0.03]		
STABDEMO					***0.53	0.12
					[0.17]	[0.19]
FEDERAL						-0.14
						[0.13]
BRITCOL						0.1
						[0.14]
PROT						*** 0.01
						[0.00]
AFRICA		* -0.36	0.19	0.04	0.21	-0.03
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.18]	[0.21]
ASIAE		0.28	0.19	0.25	0.24	0.21
		[0.27]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.21]	[0.21]
LAAM		-0.23	*** -0.49	*** -0.52	-0.27	-0.07
		[0.21]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.18]	[0.20]
OECD		***1.11	0.23	0.21	0.1	-0.05
		[0.22]	[0.18]	[0.17]	[0.21]	[0.23]
POSTCOM		*** -0.54	***-0.35	*** -0.43	-0.16	0.05
		[0.20]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.21]	[0.23]
CONSTANT	-0.16	-0.16	*** -5.32	*** -3.60	***-5.27	*-0.68
	[0.67]	[0.56]	[0.69]	[0.71]	[0.78]	[0.40]
Adj. R-sq.	0.34	0.54	0.79	0.81	0.78	0.8
N.obs.	122	122	104	112	81	75

Notice, that
all standard errors are very high.

I consulted with a few people, all said it would be impossible for these variables to have joint significance.

Again, the "joint significance" was not reported in the table submitted to AJPS

To see why it would be impossible for these variables to have joint significance, see Table 1b and table 3b (which is a copy of this table, except WLS to OLS transformation)

Notice that in Table 1b Models 5 and 6
variable PRES is not significant.
In Table 3b (or A3 in the paper), Models 5 and 6 have the same set of control variables as in Table 1b, plus two more independent variables related to the presidency are added - "finittrm" and "presfint" - - see next page.
Importantly, these two variables are also insignificant.

Table 1b. The Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption (WLS).

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Weighted Least Squares [standard errors in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
pres	***	-1.20	0.00	***	-0.50	0.00	*	-0.24	0.07		-0.17	0.14		-0.22	0.12		-0.21	0.16		-0.21	0.15
		[0.15]			[0.16]			[0.13]			[0.11]			[0.14]			[0.15]			[0.14]	
gdppc							***	0.56	0.00	***	0.46	0.00	***	0.59	0.00	***	0.56	0.00	***	0.56	0.00
								[0.07]			[0.06]			[0.08]			[0.07]			[0.07]	
curdemo							***	0.03	0.00												
								[0.01]													
freedhs										***	-0.17	0.00									
											[0.03]										
stabdemo													***	0.55	0.00		0.12	0.53		0.23	0.22
														[0.17]			[0.19]			[0.19]	
federal																	-0.14	0.28		-0.11	0.38
																	[0.13]			[0.13]	
britcol																	0.12	0.40		0.07	0.56
																	[0.14]			[0.12]	
prot																***	0.01	0.01	*	0.00	0.09
																	[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																				0.00	0.33
																				[0.00]	
logpop																				-0.11	0.26
																				[0.10]	
africa				*	-0.32	0.10		0.25	0.12		0.09	0.54		0.25	0.18		-0.03	0.89			
					[0.19]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.18]			[0.21]				
asiae					0.32	0.22		0.23	0.22	*	0.29	0.10		0.28	0.17		0.22	0.28			
					[0.26]			[0.19]			[0.18]			[0.20]			[0.20]				
laam					-0.21	0.32	***	-0.47	0.01	***	-0.50	0.00		-0.25	0.15		-0.08	0.69			
					[0.21]			[0.16]			[0.15]			[0.17]			[0.18]				
oecd				***	1.16	0.00	*	0.30	0.10		0.27	0.10		0.14	0.49		-0.03	0.89			
					[0.21]			[0.18]			[0.16]			[0.21]			[0.22]				
postcom				***	-0.51	0.01	*	-0.30	0.06	***	-0.38	0.01		-0.12	0.58		0.08	0.72			
					[0.20]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.21]			[0.22]				
_cons	***	0.90	0.00	**	0.41	0.01	***	-4.66	0.00	***	-3.04	0.00	***	-4.84	0.00	**	-0.47	0.01		-0.30	0.21
		[0.12]			[0.16]			[0.58]			[0.63]			[0.67]			[0.19]			[0.23]	
Adj. R-sq.		0.34			0.54			0.78			0.81			0.79			0.80			0.82	
N. obs.		123.00			123.00			105.00			112.00			81.00			75.00			66.00	

Recall that in Table 1b Models 5 and 6 variable PRES is not significant (see above). In Table 3b (or A3 in the paper), Models 5 and 6 have the same set of control variables plus two more independent variables related to the presidency are added - "finittrm" and "presfint" - see previous page - but these two variables are also absolutely insignificant. We can see that R2 are the same (or even lower) in Models 5 and 6 (Table 3b) with added variables "finittrm" and "presfint" - therefore, F-test would show that these variables are not jointly significant (F-test could be conducted by comparing the difference between R2 of two nested models)

Table 3b. The Effect of Term Limits on Corruption (WLS).

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Weighted Least Squares [standard errors in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
pres	-0.24	0.75		0.08	0.90	*	0.77	0.09		0.55	0.18		0.31	0.52		0.11	0.81		0.15	0.74
	[0.73]			[0.62]			[0.45]			[0.41]			[0.47]			[0.47]			[0.47]	
finittrm	1.10	0.11		0.63	0.29	**	0.82	0.05	*	0.67	0.08		0.50	0.25		0.26	0.56		0.24	0.56
	[0.68]			[0.59]			[0.40]			[0.38]			[0.43]			[0.43]			[0.41]	
presfint	-0.99	0.19		-0.62	0.34	**	-1.07	0.02	*	-0.78	0.07		-0.56	0.26		-0.37	0.46		-0.39	0.43
	[0.75]			[0.64]			[0.46]			[0.42]			[0.49]			[0.50]			[0.49]	
gdppc						***	0.55	0.00	***	0.45	0.00	***	0.58	0.00	***	0.58	0.00	***	0.55	0.00
							[0.07]			[0.06]			[0.08]			[0.08]			[0.07]	
curdemo						***	0.04	0.00												
							[0.01]													
freedhs									***	-0.17	0.00									
										[0.03]										
stabdemo												***	0.53	0.00		0.12	0.54		0.22	0.24
													[0.17]			[0.19]			[0.19]	
federal																-0.14	0.31		-0.12	0.39
																[0.13]			[0.13]	
britcol																0.10	0.48		0.06	0.62
																[0.14]			[0.12]	
prot															***	0.01	0.01	*	0.00	0.09
																[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																			0.00	0.33
																			[0.00]	
logpop																			-0.10	0.33
																			[0.10]	
africa			*	-0.36	0.08		0.19	0.21		0.04	0.77		0.21	0.25		-0.03	0.87			
				[0.20]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.18]			[0.21]				
asiae				0.28	0.30		0.19	0.32		0.25	0.16		0.24	0.25		0.21	0.32			
				[0.27]			[0.19]			[0.18]			[0.21]			[0.21]				
laam				-0.23	0.28	***	-0.49	0.00	***	-0.52	0.00		-0.27	0.14		-0.07	0.70			
				[0.21]			[0.16]			[0.15]			[0.18]			[0.20]				
oecd			***	1.11	0.00		0.23	0.22		0.21	0.22		0.10	0.63		-0.05	0.83			
				[0.22]			[0.18]			[0.17]			[0.21]			[0.23]				
postcom			***	-0.54	0.01	**	-0.35	0.03	***	-0.43	0.00		-0.16	0.46		0.05	0.83			
				[0.20]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.21]			[0.23]				
_cons	-0.16	0.81		-0.16	0.77	***	-5.32	0.00	***	-3.60	0.00	***	-5.27	0.00	*	-0.68	0.09		-0.53	0.23
	[0.67]			[0.56]			[0.69]			[0.71]			[0.78]			[0.40]			[0.44]	
Adj. R-sq.	0.34			0.54			0.79			0.81			0.78			0.80			0.82	
N. obs.	122			122			104			112			81			75			66	

Here, R2 is even lower, after two variables were added

Page 41 from the paper, February 2006 version (the JoP)

Compare with Table 3a from the dissertation below.
All THE NUMBERS are the same EXCEPT in the paper:

1) in the Model I - the main variable is falsely reported as significant

2) lower number of observations are reported, as if these were democracies only

3) tables in the Dissertation and in the BOOK did not report "joint significance"

Table 3. Effect of Term Limits on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance. ♦ jointly significant at .05 level

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Presidentialism	*-0.26	***0.87	♦0.09
	[0.21]	*[0.23]*	*[0.24]*
Term Limits	***1.03	***0.84	♦0.23
	[0.15]	*[0.14]*	*[0.20]*
Presidentialism * Term Limits	***-0.94	***-1.21	♦-0.37
	[0.27]	*[0.25]*	*[0.32]*
Basic Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Regional Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Extended Controls	*No*	*No*	*Yes*
Adj. R-sq.	0.35	0.81	0.84
Observations	82	82	75

Again, notice, that in Model III all variables have VERY high standard errors.

Once again, "joint significance" was not reported in the tables from the dissertation AND the book MS (November 2005)

"Joint significance" was first reported in the September 15, 2005 version, in the same version, where other false results were first included.

From Model 1 Table 3a (Dissertation), but the dissertation reported the Presidency coefficient as INSIGNIFICANT.
A smaller number of observations is falsely reported in the paper

From Model 3 Table 3a (Dissertation), though a smaller number of observations is falsely reported in the paper

From Model 6 Table 3a (Dissertation), though there is no evidence of "joint significance"

A smaller number of observations is reported to pretend that only democratic countries are included in the sample.

see page 25 of the paper:
"Finally, the issue of the admissible sample of countries needs to be addressed. Data availability for both corruption indices and institutions has improved greatly over the past years, which may tempt to include all available countries in our analysis. However, the theoretical conceptualization of incentives and constraints on elected official's malfeasance assumes that voters can, indeed, throw their corrupt leaders out office at the polls provided that they acquire information about politicians' graft. In other words, testing the predictions of this theoretical framework requires that at least a minimalist definition of democracy as periodic elections with reasonable amount of uncertainty about the outcome (Przeworski 1999, Przeworski et. al. 2000) is satisfied.

Therefore, the basic sample in the analysis above only includes democracies, although results on a larger sample are reported in the Appendix."

The results from the Yale dissertation were based on the sample of 123 countries - both democratic and non-democratic, combined together.

The Dissertation sample of 123 countries included presidential regimes of Iraq, Iran, N. Korea, Syria, Cuba and China among others, see below

In the Dissertation this coefficient was recorded as statistically INSIGNIFICANT, but in the paper the same coefficient is recorded as significant (see Model 1 above). Coefficient is -0.26; standard error is 0.21, p-value is 0.23 !!!

Notice also, that NO "joint significance" was reported in the dissertation tables

Table 3a. The Effect of Term Limits on Corruption (OLS).

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
pres		-0.26	0.23		0.04	0.87	***	0.87	0.00	***	0.54	0.00	**	0.31	0.05		0.09	0.71		0.18	0.48
		[0.21]			[0.25]			[0.23]			[0.13]			[0.15]			[0.24]			[0.25]	
finittrm	***	1.03	0.00	***	0.57	0.01	***	0.84	0.00	***	0.64	0.00	***	0.47	0.00		0.23	0.26		0.22	0.10
		[0.15]			[0.21]			[0.14]			[0.12]			[0.15]			[0.20]			[0.14]	
presfint	***	-0.94	0.00	*	-0.57	0.06	***	-1.21	0.00	***	-0.82	0.00	***	-0.60	0.00		-0.37	0.25		-0.44	0.12
		[0.27]			[0.30]			[0.25]			[0.15]			[0.20]			[0.32]			[0.28]	
gdppc							***	0.47	0.00	***	0.39	0.00	***	0.53	0.00	***	0.53	0.00	***	0.53	0.00
								[0.07]			[0.07]			[0.09]			[0.09]			[0.09]	
curdemo							***	0.04	0.00												
								[0.01]													
freedhs										***	-0.16	0.00									
											[0.03]										
stabdemo													***	0.58	0.00		0.15	0.55		0.23	0.26
														[0.17]			[0.25]			[0.20]	
federal																	-0.13	0.38		-0.11	0.54
																	[0.15]			[0.17]	
britcol																	0.11	0.44		0.09	0.40
																	[0.14]			[0.10]	
prot																***	0.01	0.00	**	0.00	0.04
																	[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																				0.00	0.32
																				[0.00]	
logpop																				-0.09	0.34
																				[0.10]	
africa				*	-0.36	0.05		0.17	0.21		0.04	0.79		0.20	0.23		0.01	0.98			
					[0.19]			[0.14]			[0.13]			[0.17]			[0.17]				
asiae					0.33	0.46		0.20	0.46		0.29	0.29		0.27	0.38		0.24	0.38			
					[0.45]			[0.27]			[0.28]			[0.30]			[0.27]				
laam					-0.21	0.32	***	-0.48	0.00	***	-0.44	0.00		-0.20	0.24		-0.04	0.83			
					[0.21]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.17]			[0.19]				
oecd				***	1.19	0.00		0.31	0.14	*	0.34	0.07		0.17	0.31		-0.02	0.95			
					[0.23]			[0.21]			[0.18]			[0.16]			[0.26]				
postcom				**	-0.53	0.02	***	-0.35	0.01	***	-0.42	0.00		-0.15	0.50		0.08	0.75			
					[0.22]			[0.13]			[0.11]			[0.22]			[0.25]				
_cons	***	-0.16	0.00		-0.16		***	-4.70	0.00	***	-3.04	0.00	***	-4.75	0.00	***	-0.67	0.00	**	-0.55	0.02
		[0.00]			[0.00]			[0.64]			[0.69]			[0.75]			[0.08]			[0.22]	
R-sq.		0.35			0.57			0.81			0.82			0.81			0.84			0.85	
N. obs.		122			122			104			112			81			75			66	

Page 82 from the dissertation (Yale, May 2003)

Page 40 from the paper, February 2006

Model II reports false standard error and, therefore, statistical significance.

Compare with the results reported for Model 3 in the dissertation, below

Table 2. Effect of Total Presidential Powers on Corruption

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Total Presidential Powers	***-0.09	*-0.02	-0.02
	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.02]
Basic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Regional Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Extended Controls	No	No	Yes
Adj. R-sq.	0.39	0.85	0.89
Observations	43	42	31

From Model 1 Table 2a (Dissertation)

From Model 3 Table 2a (Dissertation)

From Model 6 Table 2a (Dissertation)

Page 78 from Yale Dissertation

In the Dissertation, the very same coefficient was recorded as statistically INSIGNIFICANT, with DIFFERENT standard error:
coefficient is -0.02,Standard Error is 0.02, 0.14 is p-value

All other numbers are the same as in the paper

Table 2a. The Effect of Total Presidential Powers on Corruption (OLS).

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
totpres	***	-0.09	0.00	***	-0.07	0.00		-0.02	0.14		-0.01	0.46		-0.03	0.14		-0.02	0.37		-0.02	0.52
		[0.02]			[0.02]			[0.02]			[0.02]			[0.02]			[0.02]			[0.02]	
gdppc							***	0.74	0.00	***	0.62	0.00	***	0.70	0.00	***	0.11	0.00	**	0.10	0.01
								[0.16]			[0.15]			[0.21]			[0.03]			[0.03]	
curdemo							*	0.03	0.07												
								[0.02]													
freedhs										***	-0.19	0.00									
											[0.06]										
stabdemo													**	0.52	0.03		0.44	0.12		-0.31	0.64
														[0.23]			[0.27]			[0.64]	
federal																***	-0.49	0.00	***	-0.47	0.00
																	[0.12]			[0.09]	
britcol																	-0.41	0.29		-0.09	0.80
																	[0.38]			[0.36]	
prot																***	0.01	0.01	**	0.01	0.04
																	[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																				0.01	0.34
																				[0.01]	
logpop																				-0.02	0.91
																				[0.19]	
africa					0.27	0.25		0.33	0.23		0.30	0.28		0.38	0.22		-0.31	0.34			
					[0.23]			[0.27]			[0.27]			[0.30]			[0.32]				
asiae					0.81	0.27		0.49	0.29		0.47	0.31		0.59	0.24		0.23	0.60			
					[0.72]			[0.45]			[0.45]			[0.49]			[0.43]				
laam					-0.23	0.41		-0.31	0.36		-0.30	0.35		-0.28	0.44		-0.41	0.15			
					[0.28]			[0.33]			[0.32]			[0.35]			[0.27]				
oecd				**	0.88	0.01		0.19	0.48		0.23	0.40		-0.19	0.46	***	-1.37	0.01			
					[0.33]			[0.26]			[0.27]			[0.26]			[0.43]				
postcom				**	-0.64	0.03		-0.11	0.66		-0.01	0.96		-0.15	0.66		-0.07	0.79			
					[0.28]			[0.25]			[0.26]			[0.34]			[0.26]				
_cons	***	1.02	0.00	***	0.91	0.00	***	-6.22	0.00	***	-4.54	0.00	***	-5.60	0.01		-0.26	0.52		-0.57	0.37
		[0.21]			[0.30]			[1.45]			[1.46]			[1.93]			[0.40]			[0.62]	
R-sq.		0.39			0.66			0.85			0.87			0.82			0.89			0.80	
N obs.		43.00			43.00			42.00			42.00			32.00			31.00			27.00	

Page 39 from the paper, currently under Review in The Journal of Politics

Here, all results are false - though the numbers came from table 1a and 1b of the dissertation (see next page)

Table 1. Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Presidentialism	***-1.18	**-0.29	**-0.21
	[0.16]	*[0.12]*	*[0.10]*
Basic Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Regional Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Extended Controls	*No*	*No*	*Yes*
Adj. R-sq.	0.34	0.79	0.80
Observations	82	82	75

Model III reports a fake result, though it is similar to the result faked in table 1A (Appendix), - see above

Notice that in the version submitted to the AJPS the same coefficient (Model III) was faked in a totally different way (see next two pages)

From Model 1 Table 1a in the Dissertation, though a smaller number of observations falsely reported in the paper

From Model 3 Table 1a in the Dissertation, though a smaller number of observations falsely reported in the paper

Again, a smaller number of observations is reported to pretend that only democratic countries are included in the sample. The results from the Yale dissertation were based on the sample of 123 countries both democratic and non-democratic.

In the Dissertation this result is correctly recorded as insignificant, but in the AJPS version it becomes significant

p-value is 0.13

Table 1a. The Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption (OLS).

Dependent Variable: CORRWB. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

		Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6			Model 7
		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]	P-val.		Coeff.[St.Err.]
pres	***	-1.18	0.00	***	-0.50	0.01	**	-0.29	0.02	**	-0.23	0.04	**	-0.25	0.05		-0.24	0.16		-0.23	0.13
		[0.16]			[0.18]			[0.12]			[0.11]			[0.13]			[0.17]			[0.15]	
gdppc							***	0.50	0.00	***	0.40	0.00	***	0.53	0.00	***	0.53	0.00	***	0.53	0.00
								[0.07]			[0.07]			[0.08]			[0.08]			[0.08]	
curdemo							***	0.04	0.00												
								[0.01]													
freedhs										***	-0.16	0.00									
											[0.03]										
stabdemo													***	0.59	0.00		0.14	0.55		0.23	0.22
														[0.16]			[0.24]			[0.19]	
federal																	-0.14	0.32		-0.11	0.52
																	[0.14]			[0.17]	
britcol																	0.13	0.37		0.09	0.35
																	[0.14]			[0.10]	
prot																***	0.01	0.00	**	0.00	0.04
																	[0.00]			[0.00]	
open																				0.00	0.32
																				[0.00]	
logpop																				-0.11	0.26
																				[0.09]	
africa				*	-0.33	0.07		0.23	0.12		0.08	0.54		0.22	0.18		0.00	0.99			
					[0.18]			[0.14]			[0.14]			[0.16]			[0.17]				
asiae					0.35	0.42		0.21	0.41		0.31	0.26		0.28	0.34		0.23	0.37			
					[0.44]			[0.26]			[0.27]			[0.30]			[0.26]				
laam					-0.20	0.33	***	-0.47	0.00	***	-0.44	0.00		-0.21	0.20		-0.05	0.76			
					[0.20]			[0.15]			[0.14]			[0.16]			[0.17]				
oecd				***	1.22	0.00	*	0.36	0.09	**	0.38	0.04		0.19	0.24		0.00	0.99			
					[0.22]			[0.21]			[0.18]			[0.16]			[0.25]				
postcom				**	-0.52	0.02	**	-0.33	0.01	***	-0.38	0.00		-0.11	0.59		0.10	0.65			
					[0.21]			[0.13]			[0.11]			[0.21]			[0.23]				
_cons	***	0.84	0.00	*	0.37	0.06	***	-4.06	0.00	***	-2.55	0.00	***	-4.36	0.00	**	-0.47	0.02		-0.32	0.19
		[0.14]			[0.20]			[0.61]			[0.66]			[0.72]			[0.20]			[0.24]	
R-sq.		0.34			0.57			0.79			0.81			0.81			0.84			0.85	
N obs.		123.00			123.00			105.00			112.00			81.00			75.00			66.00	

Table 1. Effect of Presidentialism on Corruption

Dependent Variable: *CORRWB*. Estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors [in square brackets].
Significance: *** for p<.01; ** for .05>p ≥.01; * for .10>p ≥.05. p reported for 2-tailed tests of significance.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Presidentialism	***-1.18	**-0.29	*-0.23
	[0.16]	*[0.12]*	*[0.15]*
Basic Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Regional Controls	*No*	*Yes*	*Yes*
Extended Controls	*No*	*No*	*Yes*
Adj. R-sq.	0.34	0.79	0.85
Observations	82	82	66

In the AJPA version (p.34) the same coefficient was falsely reported as statistically significant
(see the previous page)

Again, the current version (the JoP) falsifies the same coefficient differently, to pretend that it is even more statistically significant

Page 85 from Yale dissertation.
Lists the 123 countries used to produce results in the dissertation (Yale, May 2003) and, as seen above, in fact, in the paper under review at the JoP.

A2. Ranking of countries by CORRWB (from most corrupt to least corrupt), including the indicators for presidentialism (PRES), total presidential powers (TOTPRES), and finite term in office (PRESFINT).

rank	country	corrwb	pres	totpres	presfint
1	Niger	-1.567	1	.	1
2	Tajikistan	-1.316	1	12	1
3	Turkmenistan	-1.289	1	18	1
4	Iraq	-1.265	1	.	0
5	Liberia	-1.051	1	.	0
6	Somalia	-1.051	.	.	.
7	Sudan	-1.015	1	.	1
8	Gabon	-1.015	1	.	1
9	Azerbaijan	-0.998	1	.	0
10	Yugoslavia	-0.995	1	.	1
11	Albania	-0.985	0	.	0
12	Uzbekistan	-0.963	1	18	1
13	Paraguay	-0.958	1	22	1
14	Honduras	-0.938	1	14	1
15	Tanzania	-0.924	1	.	1
16	Ukraine	-0.892	1	13	1
17	Algeria	-0.878	1	.	1
18	Kazakhstan	-0.869	1	18	1
19	Angola	-0.863	1	.	1
20	Yemen	-0.854	1	.	1
21	Papua New Guinea	-0.854	0	.	0
22	Iran	-0.848	1	.	1
23	Guinea	-0.848	1	.	1
24	Nicaragua	-0.836	1	15	1
25	Guatemala	-0.819	1	16	1
26	Ecuador	-0.819	1	14	1
27	Armenia	-0.803	1	14.5	0

rank	country	corrwb	pres	totpres	presfint
28	Indonesia	-0.799	1	.	1
29	Syria	-0.789	1	.	1
30	Benin	-0.781	1	.	1
31	Dominican Rep.	-0.773	1	14	1
32	Pakistan	-0.769	0	.	0
33	Kyrgyz Rep.	-0.763	1	16.5	1
34	Venezuela	-0.725	1	12	1
35	Kenya	-0.651	1	.	1
36	Russian Federation	-0.616	1	15	1
37	Zambia	-0.614	1	.	1
38	Bulgaria	-0.557	1	.	0
39	Mozambique	-0.535	1	.	1
40	Korea, N.	-0.535	1	.	1
41	Haiti	-0.535	1	.	1
42	Macedonia	-0.517	1	2	1
43	Colombia	-0.490	1	13	1
44	Mali	-0.476	1	.	1
45	Madagascar	-0.469	1	.	1
46	Uganda	-0.466	1	.	1
47	Croatia	-0.464	1	9	1
48	Panama	-0.458	1	17	1
49	Bolivia	-0.438	1	14	1
50	Lebanon	-0.397	1	.	1
51	El Salvador	-0.354	1	15	1
52	Turkey	-0.349	0	.	0
53	Vietnam	-0.332	1	.	1
54	Zimbabwe	-0.319	0	.	0
55	India	-0.306	0	.	0
56	Ghana	-0.301	1	.	1
57	Bangladesh	-0.289	0	.	0
58	China	-0.289	1	.	1
59	Mexico	-0.277	1	17	1
60	Argentina	-0.275	1	14	1
61	Latvia	-0.264	0	.	0
62	Togo	-0.242	0	.	0

rank	country	corrwb	pres	totpres	presfint
63	Philippines	-0.228	1	16	1
64	Peru	-0.200	1	9	1
65	Malawi	-0.195	1	.	1
66	Guinea-Bissau	-0.176	1	.	1
67	Thailand	-0.165	0	.	0
68	Mongolia	-0.145	1	.	1
69	Sri Lanka	-0.124	1	16	1
70	Jamaica	-0.116	0	.	0
71	Guyana	-0.019	1	.	1
72	Sierra Leone	-0.019	1	.	1
73	Suriname	-0.019	0	.	0
74	Gambia	-0.019	1	.	.
75	Swaziland	0.007	1	.	0
76	Tunisia	0.020	1	.	1
77	Lithuania	0.034	1	6	1
78	Brazil	0.058	1	21	1
79	Morocco	0.125	1	.	0
80	Jordan	0.139	1	.	0
81	Lesotho	0.188	0	.	0
82	Cuba	0.274	1	.	1
83	South Africa	0.299	1	.	1
84	Mauritius	0.336	0	.	0
85	Namibia	0.382	1	12	1
86	Uruguay	0.430	1	17	1
87	Poland	0.492	1	7	1
88	Malta	0.497	0	.	0
89	Botswana	0.535	0	.	0
90	Costa Rica	0.577	1	13	1
91	Hungary	0.614	0	0	0
92	Kuwait	0.619	1	.	0
93	Malaysia	0.633	0	.	0
94	Belgium	0.672	0	.	0
95	Japan	0.724	0	.	0
96	Italy	0.802	0	.	0
97	Fiji	0.807	0	.	0
98	Greece	0.825	0	.	0

rank	country	corrwb	pres	totpres	presfint
99	Slovenia	1.023	0	0	0
100	Chile	1.029	1	20	1
101	Spain	1.214	0	.	0
102	Portugal	1.218	0	0	0
103	Israel	1.277	1	.	1
104	France	1.282	0	0	0
105	United States	1.407	1	13	1
106	Austria	1.457	0	0	0
107	Ireland	1.567	0	0	0
108	Korea, S.	1.590	1	15	1
109	Australia	1.601	0	.	0
110	Germany	1.620	0	.	0
111	Luxembourg	1.671	0	.	0
112	Norway	1.687	0	.	0
113	United Kingdom	1.707	0	.	0
114	Cyprus	1.811	1	.	1
115	Iceland	1.831	0	0	0
116	Singapore	1.948	0	.	0
117	Netherlands	2.026	0	.	0
118	Canada	2.055	0	.	0
119	Switzerland	2.072	0	.	0
120	New Zealand	2.075	0	.	0
121	Finland	2.085	0	0	0
122	Sweden	2.085	0	.	0
123	Denmark	2.129	0	.	0